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'I intend the present work as a polite and respectful but strong and
objectively founded call to action'. Thus Kenneth Shapiro concludes
his Introduction (p.14) to this powerful and pathbreaking treatise. A
clinical psychologist himself, and at the time of writing Executive
Director of Psychologists for the Ethical Treatment of Animals,
Shapiro has been publishing on the topic of his colleagues' utilisation
of animal models for a decade and a half. With its comprehensive
coverage and careful analysis of facts and issues, this latest book
provides a unique combination of consideration of and examination
of ethical systems in terms of their implications for the policies
regulating animal research, and of a particular area of animal
research in terms of its success as a scientific enterprise.
Also in the Introduction, Shapiro outlines his plan to address both
sets of major beliefs about animal research - the one that views it as
senseless and wrong, and the other that sees it as a necessary basis of
science. He ends up censuring the protagonists of both, for partisan
support without a solid critical base. A sample of conceptual flavours
to come is given in the 'preliminary landmarks' of the respective
positions. While both hold that animals in the laboratory are
transformed from their actual state of being, on the one hand the
critics of animal research regard them as being reduced to a lesser
status by virtue of becoming just part of the laboratory scene, whereas
its proponents construct them as transcendent objects serving the
cause of the expansion of knowledge. A fine sample of the author's
personal style is provided in his pithy policy statement on matters
linguistic.
Psychology, Shapiro points out, is for two reasons of particular
significance in any consideration of the use of animals in laboratory
research. Firstly, courses in the discipline are taken by such huge
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numbers of students that it must needs figure largely in the
formation of attitudes towards this controversial issue. Secondly, for
whatever reason, psychology has been one of the prime targets of the
contemporary animal rights movement. The fact that psychologists
were caught unprepared by this unwelcome attention certainly
highlights the need for an examination of its whys and wherefores
such as is here offered.
The treatise is clearly structured, and presented in such a way as to
enlighten and instruct both newcomers to and those already
acquainted with the discipline and practices of psychology. The first
chapter, dealing with current practices and attitudes in psychology's
use of animals, is an absolute treasure house of information.
Reviewing a range of previous studies on the topic, Shapiro comes to
cautious conclusions on matters such as the numbers of animals
used annually in United States psychology laboratories (one and a
quarter to two and a half million!) and elsewhere, on changing rates
of such usage, on relative proportions of species of animals used and
in what fields. He identifies his focus as being on that research
approach which situates animals as models of particular aspects of
the human condition, in contrast to that which studies animals for
their own sake, or even that which conceives of psychological
processes as being universal across species. Animal model research is
distinguished by its targeting disorders and dysfunctions, and
attempting their induction in animals in the laboratory. An amazing
list of eighty-one conditions for which animals have been used as
models is presented on p.29 - 'it is evident that psychologists have
attempted to develop an animal model for virtually every known
problem in the human condition that has even a remotely
psychological cast', (p.30)
Ensuing chapters discuss how animals have come to be
conceptualised in psychological laboratory-based research. Adopting
a constructionist perspective on the sociology of knowledge, Shapiro
examines the strategy of creating animal models of human disorders
via examples from the field of eating disorders. He argues that such
models are in point of fact decidedly distanced from actual clinical
knowledge and treatment of these disorders. This is because the
development of models is heavily constrained by the laboratory
situation, 'a place away from the buzzing confusion, the
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uncontrollable flow of events of the ordinary world'.(p.63) The socalled lab animal itself is a product of social construction, with its
interplay of human and institutional processes and attitudes. In
turn, the technologizing of the laboratory means that the behaviours
studied are elicited rather than occurring naturally, and are recorded,
in mathematical format, rather than observed.
Chapter 3 tackles head-on the all too often evaded theoretical issue of
the formal status of the model. A model is an analogy, it is not itself
the phenomenon of interest its creator allegedly wishes to
illuminate. At best, Shapiro asserts, animal models in psychology
may provide weak analogies to human behavioural disorders,
heavily embedded as are the latter in exclusively human social
structures and influences. But in fact these models fail to function
even as heuristic devices, and to generate ideas that are then tested
on that which they claim to resemble. In consequence not only of the
disparity between the laboratory and the clinical settings, but also of
that between the professional worlds of animal experimenters and
clinicians, the work has had almost no impact on treatment practices.
The latter claim is substantiated by a most impressive array of
empirical data, presented in the next chapter.
This central chapter commences with a description of the two
primary eating disorders, bulimia nervosa and anorexia nervosa, and
the stress induction animal models of them, respectively the overeating elicited by sham feeding and tail pinching, and the selfstarvation consequent on forced hyperactivity. Analysis of these
models reveals two primary limitations - the restricted number and
simplistic character of those features modelled, and the focus on
symptoms at the expense of causation. Shapiro argues that their use
is actually counter-productive, beginning from what are for the most
part arbitrary starting points, and shaping up a research enterprise
that is in-grown in nature, concentrating on the comparison with
each other of various laboratory models and variables. Their bias is
towards physiological explanation at the expense of culture and
personal dynamics; one consequence of this is a preoccupation with
technology and procedures for their own sake. The author then
reports on a survey he has conducted on thirty clinicians specializing
in the treatment of eating disorders. Sixty per cent of the respondents
were unaware of the existence of animal models in their field, and
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no-one displayed any detailed knowledge or understanding of any
such. Eighty-seven per cent denied any influence of such models on
their treatment approach. A citation analysis instigated by Shapiro,
targeting nine investigators in the field of relevant animal
modelling, demonstrated a low overall frequency of citation of this
work in the psychological literature. More significantly, in the
present context, no citations at all occurred in the journals named as
being helpful in their work by the clinicians in the aforesaid survey!
The final two chapters deal with the ethical and policy issues raised
by the foregoing material. Current practice in psychology is found
woefully lacking in respect of both sets of discourse. It would be hard
to find a more comprehensive and balanced review of the literature
in either category than is provided here. On the basis of this review
the author arrives at his own personal position. He condemns
'official psychology' for its global defence of animal research as such,
independent of a consideration of the merits of particular studies,
and for its convenient line that the benefits of any one investigation
cannot be determined in advance, and may in any case be m uch
delayed. No more than lipservice is paid by it to utilitarianism 'official psychology exploits certain openings in a utilitarian
philosophy to override the provision of any meaningful lim itation
on animal suffering in research', (p.280) Shapiro himself decides that
the use of Peter Singer's utilitarian ethic is limited, favouring instead
a combination of this with Tom Regan's case for individual rights
wherein priority is given to rights over a cost-benefit analysis. Thus
certain procedures with a severe degree of invasiveness should be
banned in principle, regardless of any possible benefits of their use.
Shapiro's hope for the impact of his present contribution is that it
will lead to increased public and professional awareness of the state
of play regarding the enterprise of animal model research in
psychology, and that ending its closed shop status will in turn lead to
a demand for the radical curtailment of such research.
Where then will this 'strong and objectively founded call to action'
be heard? The animal rights movement will of course find in it an
expansion of their artillery with regard to the use of animals in
psychology. In Australia, for instance, the line taken by Shapiro ties
in very closely with that taken by the Australian Association for
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Humane
Research,
which
emphasizes
the
scientific
inappropriateness of using animal models and data for research on
humans, though mainly instancing medical practice. It will be
intriguing to see the frequency and location of citations of this book
itself in the psychological literature over, say, the first decade after its
publication. Shapiro is a first class theoretician, and one would hope
to find references to specific aspects of his analysis of theoretical
issues such as the formal status of the model in journals such as
Theory and Psychology.
I have not mentioned his brief but
insightful forays into the historical realm; researchers into the
history of behaviourism and the development of laboratory
procedures and ideologies for instance may well refer to him.
Whether clinicians in the field of eating disorders will take notice of
the book is a moot point; after all if, as Shapiro demonstrates, they
are already uninterested in animal research purporting to model
these disorders, they may or may not make time to peruse a
monograph whose views reinforce or elaborate on those they already
hold. The book clearly provides ample ammunition for those
(regrettably few) psychologists actively concerned with questions of
animal rights; it will hopefully also become a source book for courses
and committees dealing with laboratory codes of practice. The
hundred dollar question remains as to the extent to which the
animal researchers themselves will take notice of Shapiro's
evaluation of their activities and position. My prediction is that
many of them will in fact respond; the quality of argument, extent of
coverage of issues and skilful employment of empirical backup,
make this critical foray into their field too substantial to be easily
ignored. Entrenched positions however are not readily abandoned;
the incidence of citations need not correlate with actual changes of
viewpoint. Nonetheless, once it is referenced in the literature, this
treatise will be accessed by students, that group still in the process of
taking up positions on ethical matters and determining career paths;
here Shapiro should indeed make a mark.
Alison M.Turtle
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Georges Chapouthier and Jean-Claude Nouet, eds. The U niversal
Declaration o f Animal Rights: Comments and Intentions, 93pp.,
Ligue Frangaise des Droits de VAnimal, Paris 1998.

The Universal Declaration o f Animal Rights is an expression of
some of the theoretical concerns emanating from France and in
particular from the French Animal Rights League (Ligue Frangaise
des Droits de 1'Animal) including criticisms of the two main currents
of thought regarding animals in English-speaking countries, ie. the
views of Regan and Singer.
The book has seven contributors with the discussion framed by the
two editors, Nouet beginning and Chapouthier completing the
volume. The authors have a range of backgrounds in philosophy,
medicine, law and art history but philosophy dominates.
Nouet, a professor of medicine explains that the Universal
Declaration of Animal Rights was proclaimed in Paris in 1978 and
presented to the United Nations. The Declaration recognises
the equal rights for all living non-human beings to exist
on earth. The intention of the Universal Declaration of
Animal Rights is to establish an egalitarian right to life, no
matter what the species be and...in the context of and with
respect to the balance of nature (p.9).
Nouet cites the following authors as important influences leading to
this declaration: Thomas Young, Jeremy Bentham, Henry Salt and
Andre Geraud. Various charters which have been proposed to
protect animals from 1950s on, also formed the background to the
1978 Charter. It has subsequently been refined and presented to
UNESCO in 1989 by the International League. The text is remarkable
for its scope and succinctness and is therefore produced below in full:
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Universal D eclaration o f Animal Rights
P ream ble
-Considering that Life is one, all living beings having
common origin and having diversified in the course
of the evolution o f the species,
-Considering that all living beings possess natural
rights, and that any animal with a nervous system
has specific rights,
-Considering that the contempt for, and even the
simple ignorance of, these natural rights, cause
serious damage to Nature and lead men to commit
crimes against animals,
-Considering that the coexistence o f species implies a
recognition by the human species o f the right of
other animal species to live,
-Considering that the respect o f animals by humans
is inseparable from the respect o f men for each other,
it is hereby proclaim ed
ARTICLE 1
All animals have equal rights to exist within the
context o f biological equilibrium.
This equality o f rights does not overshadow the
diversity o f species and of individuals.
ARTICLE 2
All animal life has the right to be respected.
ARTICLE 3
1. Animals must not be subjected to bad treatments
or to cruel acts.
2. If it is necessary to kill an animal, it must be
instantaneous, painless and cause no apprehension.
3. A dead animal must be treated with decency.
ARTICLE 4
1. Wild animals have the right to live and to
reproduce in freedom in their own natural
en viron m en t.
2. The prolonged deprivation o f the freedom o f wild
animals, hunting and fishing practised as a pastime,
as well as any use o f wild animals for reasons that
are not vital, are contrary to this fundamental right.
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ARTICLE 5
1. Any animal which is dependent on man has the right
to proper maintenance and care.
2. It must under no circumstances be abandoned or
killed unjustifiably.
3. All forms of breeding and uses o f the animal must
respect the physiology and behaviour specific to the
species.
4. Exhibitions, shows and film s involving animals m u st
also respect their dignity and must not include any
violence whatsoever.
ARTICLE 6
1. Experiments on animals entailing physical or
psychological suffering violate the rights o f animals.
2. Replacement methods must be developed and
system atically implemented.
ARTICLE 7
Any act unnecessarily involving the death o f an an im al,
and any decision leading to such an act, constitute a
crime against life.
ARTICLE 8
1. Any act compromising the survival o f a wild species
and any decision leading to such an act are tantamount
to genocide, that is to say, a crime against the species.
2. The massacre o f wild animals, and the pollution and
destruction o f biotopes are acts o f genocide.
ARTICLE 9
1. The specific legal status o f animals and their rights
must be recognised in law.
2. The protection and safety o f animals must be
represented at the level o f Governmental
organizations.
ARTICLE 10
Educational and school authorities must ensure that
citizens learn from childhood to observe, understand
and respect animals.
The Universal Declaration o f Animal Rights was
solemnly proclaimed in Paris on 15 October 1978 at
the UNESCO headquarters. The text, revised by the
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International League o f Animal Rights in 1989, was
submitted to the UNESCO Director General in 1990
and made public that same year, (pp.80-81)

Nouet stresses the need to abolish the hierarchy between humans
and animals arguing that humans and animals may have different
features but these differences do not mean that humans have some
special status or privilege.
The position of animals in French law is discussed by Suzanne
Antoine, a Judge at the Court of Appeal in Paris. Animal rights are
not included in French law. However there is some protection for
domestic animals and 'wild animals tamed or kept in captivity' (p.
18). This protection is limited and not consistent between the various
legal codes, though animals are usually considered as objects similar
to other items of property. French criminal law since 1992 does
prohibit physical abuse and acts of cruelty to animals. This includes
the abandonment of animals and the use of animals for scientific
experiments not complying with official regulations. It is interesting
that the latter is brought under the criminal code, rather than a
breach of a more loosely defined animal welfare regulation as is
common in many countries.
Bull fights and cock fights are exempted from the French anti-cruelty
law if there is proof of an uninterrupted local tradition, a feature
which Antoine deplores. In a separate chapter Elisabeth HardouinFugier examines Spanish bullfighting in France pointing out the
powerful interests supporting this cruel practice and the difficulty
that opponents have in even getting heard.
Antoine points out that no protection is given to individual wild
animals in French law. However conservation of the species is
covered by legislation. Antoine argues that this is a weak law and
that the application is made problematic by hunting interests. She
regards hunting as a practice which should no longer be tolerated in
any civilized country and notes the absurd example of the hunting of
migratory birds. Species which are protected in neighbouring
countries may be legally shot when they fly over France.

91

Animal Issues, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2000
The French legal situation stands in sharp contrast to the Declaration
of Animal Rights. However Antoine mentions a promising m ove
from some French lawyers to recognize animals as 'subjects' with a
certain number of rights.
The philosopher Florence Burgat draws on Rousseau in an attempt
to work out whether there is a basis in natural law to oblige humans
not to harm animals. She concludes that it is the capacity of animals
to suffer which draws them into the same moral domain as humans
and promotes the recognition of animal rights. (Bentham and Singer
should be acknowledged here but are not.) Burgat claims that this
should lead to different legislation than for instance the anti-cruelty
codes which only serve to re-enforce the dominant position of
humans who may act charitably to inferior beings.
Goffi, another philosopher, directly engages with Singer's
utilitarianism. He presents a novel logical argument against Singer's
view and supports the extension of the moral domain beyond
sentient beings. In fact Goffi believes that 'the moral community is
the same as the community of living organisms' (p.67), while there is
a hierarchy of different forms of individual good.
Goffi also evaluates Regan's position, granting that he presents a very
strong case in defence of animal rights which questioning Regan's
view on inherent value. Curiously, I take the opposite of this stand.
Regan's notion of inherent value seems to me to be on the right track
even though flawed. (His definition of inherent value draws too
heavily on what is of value to humans). Regan's view on rights
strikes me as an unnecessary 'add-on'.
Chapouthier discusses animal rights in relation to human rights,
ranking them on different levels but arguing that human rights take
precedence over animal rights only when the human rights to life
and health are under threat. Charpouthier argues perhaps
surprisingly that animal rights and human rights usually operate in
the same direction.
The articles in this volume engage with debates appearing in English
on animal rights but they offer new perspectives both in terms of
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critique and positive theory. Hopefully this translation into English
will mean that reverse engagement will occur.

Readers interested in obtaining a copy of The Universal Declaration
o f Animal Rights: Comments and Intentions should contact Ligue
Frangaise des Droits de YAnimal, 39 Rue Claude Bernard, 75005 Paris,
France.

Denise Russell

Mark A. Michael, editor, Preserving Nature: An
Perspective, 307pp., Humanity Books, New York, 2000.

International

Mark Michael's anthology on wildlife preservation offers an
enlightening and disturbing introduction to some of the most
important questions facing conservationists. According to Michael,
the contributors all share the assumption that 'wildlife should be
preserved (p.8). .Perhaps because of its status as an assumption, this
sentiment escapes any significant analysis, leaving poorly explored a
range of issues, including the definition of nature, of wildlife and of
preservation. The book highlights a startling disjunction between
conservation and animal rights perspectives on wild animals, and
this too, could have been explored more fully.
The first section contains three articles which debate moral issues
around human intervention into the lives of wild animals. A case
against assisting injured wild animals is made, and a survey of the
impact of the tagging and studying of endangered species is offered.
Also included is a rather frustrating criticism of sport hunting by
Roger J. H. King, which depends heavily on eco-feminist arguments.
Most frustrating about the critique is its failure to question the
meaning of 'nature'. The article makes clear that many of those who
oppose hunting see humans as distinct from nature; as a danger to its
delicate balance and even its survival. However, some proponents of
hunting argue that the desire to prey upon other species is itself
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natural in humans. As such, hunting is inevitable and perhaps even
desirable. Where anti-hunting arguments appeal to unanalysed
notions of nature in this way, they must expect to be met with
opposing arguments equally invested in the easy authority wielded
by the term, 'nature'.
The second section takes a close look at approaches to habitat
conservation and the treatment of exotic species that threaten the
well-being of endangered native animals. The wisdom of attempting
to save individual species through captive breeding programmes is
explored, as is the culling of introduced species thought to be a
danger to other flora and fauna. It is perhaps in this section that the
gulf between animal rights advocates and conservationists emerges
most clearly. The US National Parks Service's decision to destroy a
population of goats is debated in an exchange that overtly addresses
some of the issues behind this gulf, while other articles hint at them.
Andrew Cohen's article, 'Weeding the Garden' expresses strong
dissatisfaction with a gull culling programme he participated in, and
reveals some very disturbing attitudes towards non-native species.
Any approach which labels overabundant species 'garbage animals'
(as does one ecologist with the Environmental Defense Fund that
Cohen quotes) has no chance of meaningfully reversing the negative
effects humans have already had on other species or of building a
future that safeguards the diversity of animal species and their
welfare.
It is at this point that questions raised by the book's inadequately
defined title assert themselves. What is wildlife? Why preserve it?
Can what is preserved remain 'wild'? Should some animals suffer to
preserve human understandings of the wild? For whose benefit is
endangered wildlife preserved? Where the preservation of some
animals appears to necessitate brutal poisoning regimes for others
(the gulls in Cohen's article take up to two days to die (p.85)), it is
clear that animal welfare is not at stake. Nor is it at stake in captive
breeding programmes involving the release of bred animals and the
subsequent death of most of these animals (17 out of 20 in the case of
the tamarins in Robert Loftins' 'Captive breeding of endangered
species (p.113).). Unless one wishes to argue that animals care
whether their species persists, captive breeding projects do not serve
individual members of endangered species well.
94

Animal Issues, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2000

Perhaps it is possible to argue that these interventions have an
animal welfare component because if individual species die out, the
ecological system in which they function will be damaged and many
other animals will die as a consequence. This is an important
consideration. However, another issue that must be confronted is
whether in some cases, the animals subjected to intensive breeding
programmes in captivity are those whose numbers have become so
depleted that their role in their traditional ecosystems is minimal. If
such cases occur, the preservation of these species appears to be
motivated mainly by the desire to maintain a diverse environm ent
for human benefit. Are captive breeding programmes and culling
justified in such cases?
Section three mainly examines the role game hunting and
harvesting can play in conservation in developing nations. The
history of conservation as bound up with imperialism is highlighted
here, and negative perceptions of conservation among Tanzanian
pastoralists and Zambian villagers are shown to be the result of
inequitable practices around land appropriation and profit-sharing
from sport hunting and tourism. The articles in this section make
clear that poor rural people often bear the brunt of conservation
programmes initiated elsewhere, at the behest of foreigners.
It is unsurprising then, that economic incentives in the form of
employment associated with sport hunting and the harvesting of
meat, horn and ivory are required to secure the participation of
impoverished peoples in conservation. In light of this, it would have
been valuable to include an examination of the ways in which
Western nations and individuals might be exhorted to systematically
bear some of the cost of conservation in poorer countries. After all, it
is the West that so strongly demands conservation, and it is the W est
that is more able to afford it.
The last section takes a similar tack in looking at several ways in
which conservation of animals, such as elephants in Graeme
Caughley's 'Elephants and Economics', and land in Gordon Grigg's
'Kangaroo Harvesting and the Conservation of Arid and Semi-Arid
Rangelands' can be effected through the development of new
markets for animal produce. Martha Groom, et al. take a slightly
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different approach by examining a tourism market in Peru that
revolves around watching animals rather than farming or hunting
them, but they indicate that this kind of marketing, if poorly
regulated, can also have a negative impact on wild animals. This
section contains some valuable discussion of economic issues around
conservation. Does classical economic theory warrant application to
conservation? Do economic incentives really encourage the
protection of endangered species?
Preserving Wildlife is an interesting if rather limited look at some of
the issues surrounding conservation today. Animal rights advocates
may be disturbed by some of the conservation practices documented
here. These are particularly difficult to accept because the book fails to
offer any detailed or convincing exposition on the foundations of
conservation, its specific rationale, and perhaps most importantly,
the limits of its legitimacy. This is not to say, of course, that
conservation is wrong or pointless. However, important questions
need to remain on the agenda. If conservation seeks to protect the
natural world, what is nature? What is the status of hum an
behaviour in nature? What is the status of those non-native species
that 'naturally' thrive in habitat required for survival by other,
native, species? Whose idea of nature is being protected? In short,
what is being conserved, how, and at whose cost?

Suzanne Fraser
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